

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2965
OF 070125Z DECEMBER 90
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS, BUCHAREST, HELSINKI, ABIDJAN
INFO PRIORITY BOGATA, ADDIS ABABA, KUALA LUMPUR, HAVANA
INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, KINSHASA, ACTOR

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 2209 AND 2210: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES:
SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

SUMMARY

1. BAKER STATES PUBLICLY THAT THE US IS NOT SUPPORTING A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD SEEK TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ADMINISTRATION STILL HAVE TWO OTHER SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST TEXT. STATE WILL BE SEEKING BAKER'S VIEWS OVERNIGHT. POSSIBILITY HE MAY WISH TO CONSULT YOU.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO STATE DEPARTMENT (NEA AND IO) ABOUT US INTENTIONS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, FOLLOWING THE PRESS STORY TODAY ABOUT A CHANGE IN US POLICY ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

3. STATE WERE PHLEGMATIC ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE EPISODE. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THE NOTIONAL ELEMENTS FOR INCLUSION IN A RESOLUTION, WHICH PICKERING HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS WITH THE MALAYSIANS, HAD NOT INCLUDED WORDING ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WHEN THE MALAYSIANS HAD PRESSED FOR THIS, PICKERING HAD AGREED TO PUT IT TO WASHINGTON (WHILE COMMENTING THAT HE WAS SURE WASHINGTON WOULD NOT ACCEPT A REFERENCE IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS). STATE TOLD US THAT THE TEXT WHICH EMERGED FOLLOWING US/ MALAYSIAN DISCUSSIONS (SECOND TUR) WAS MERELY INDICATIVE OF WORK IN PROGRESS AND DID NOT EVEN HAVE AD REFERENDUM STATUS. STATE THOUGHT THAT THE MALAYSIANS MIGHT HAVE OVERSOLD IT (INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE REFERENCE) TO THEIR CONSPONSORS, THUS SPARKING PRESS INTEREST. BUT STATE ALSO IMPLIED THAT PICKERING HAD NOT HANDLED THE MATTER VERY ADEPTLY.

4. STATE SAID THAT, PRIOR TO THE PRESS STORY, THEY HAD BEEN WRESTLING WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE POINT. SINCE THE FINNISH WORDING CLOSELY REFLECTED EXISTING US POLICY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO REJECT OUTRIGHT. BUT THEY THOUGHT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR INCLUSION IN A RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME, AND OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION. A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN A BRIEF PREAMBULAR REFERENCE WHICH WOULD HAVE DRAWN LESS ATTENTION. BUT STATE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOW NO POSSIBILITY OF THE US ACCEPTING ANY WORDING ON ANY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. SECRETARY BAKER HAD SPELT OUT THE US POSITION ON THE HILL THIS MORNING (TEXT IN MIFT).

5. STATE COMMENTED THAT, ASIDE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE POINT, THE ADMINISTRATION STILL HAD TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST DRAFT:

I) THEY WERE NOT READY TO SUPPORT A MEETING OF HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES (HCP), NOR TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF THE HCP (AS A BODY) URGING ISRAEL TO RESPECT THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. THEY COULD LIVE WITH WORDING WHICH CALLED ON STATES (WHICH WERE HCP) TO TAKE ACTION BILATERALLY WITH ISRAEL.

II) THEY ALSO HAD TROUBLE WITH THE IDEA OF CHARGING UN PERSONNEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH MONITORING AND OBSERVING THE SITUATION. THEY THOUGHT THIS WOULD JEOPARDISE THE WORK OF THE UN AGENCIES. THEY WERE LOOKING AT ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS WHICH CALLED ON THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO MONITOR AND OBSERVE (WITHOUT SPECIFYING HOW HE WOULD DO THIS).

6. IN VIEW OF THESE PROBLEMS, STATE SAID THEY WOULD BE SEEKING BAKER'S VIEWS THIS EVENING. THEY WOULD BE ASKING WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES REMAINING, THE SECRETARY WISHED TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON A TEXT (BY PURSUING THE IDEAS IN PARA 5 ABOVE). STATE EXPECTED BAKER TO AUTHORISE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE MALAYSIANS. IF HE DID NOT, THEY WOULD SEEK HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON VOTING. THEIR ADVICE TO HIM WAS NOT YET AGREED INTERNALLY BUT IT WAS LIKELY TO BE THAT THE PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT ARISE WITH ARAB GULF COALITION PARTNERS AS A RESULT OF A US VETO WERE NOT SO SEVERE AS TO OUTWEIGH THE OBJECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE TO THE RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, THEY WERE STILL LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY

OF DEFEATING THE RESOLUTION WITHOUT USE OF THE VETO, BY
PERSUADING ENOUGH OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS TO ABSTAIN. STATE
THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE BAKER MIGHT WISH TO CALL YOU EARLY
TOMORROW TO DISCUSS THIS.

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ADDITIONAL 12

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