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TO DESKBY 021600Z FC0 TELNO 014

OF D21418Z JANUARY 91

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, LUXEMBOURG

INFO PRIORITY GULF POSTS, TEHRAN, CAIRO, OTHER EC POSTS, MOSCOW INFO PRIORITY PEKING, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ALGIERS, AMMAN

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, ACTOR

MY TELNO DD1: EC DISCUSSION AT LUXEMBOURG

SUMMARY

1. PRINCE SAUD CONCERNED AT GERMAN WAVERING. WORRY THAT LUXEMBOURG MEETING MIGHT LEAD TO DIVERGENCE IN US AND EC POSITIONS. SAUD UNABLE TO MEET YOU IN BAHRAIN BUT MAY FIT IN TRAVEL TO UK AFTER 8 JANUARY.

DETAIL

2. I WAS SUMMONED BY PRINCE SAUD ON 2 JANUARY TO DISCUSS FORTHCOMING EC MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG ON 4 JANUARY. THIS GAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUT OVER OUR POSITION ON THE EPC MEETING CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 110 TO LUXEMBOURG OF 31 DECEMBER, ON YOUR BEHALF. I EMPHASISED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF A REVIEW MEETING AND OUR INTENTION TO SEE THE EC CONTINUE TO SEND A CLEAR AND CONSISTENT MESSAGE TO SADDAM THAT HE MUST LEAVE KUWAIT. THE PRESENT EC MANDATE HAD OUR FULL SUPPORT. SAUD ASKED WHETHER OUR VIEWS WERE SHARED BY PARTNERS. HE HAD BEEN ON THE WHOLE REASSURED BY PRESIDENT MITTERAND'S SPEECH ON 1 JANUARY, ESPECIALLY ON FRENCH READINESS TO FACE HOSTILITIES, BUT WAS WORRIED ABOUT GERMAN BACKSLIDING IMPLIED IN GENSCHER'S STATEMENT ON 31 DECEMBER. HE HAD ASKED THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN BONN TO OBTAIN A CLEARER READ-OUT OF THE GERMAN POSITION FROM THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE. THE OFFICE HAD REPLIED THAT THE GERMAN POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED SINCE THE 18 DECEMBER MEETING BUT HAD STILL STRESSED THE RELUCTANCE OF GERMANY TO SEE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. SAUD WAS WORRIED THAT THE GENSCHER STATEMENT TOGETHER WITH THE EQUIVOCAL REPLY FROM THE CHANCELLERY SUGGESTED THAT GERMANY WAS ONLY HALF HEARTED IN HER SUPPORT FOR SCR 678. HE APPRECIATED THAT THE COMMUNITY'S STATEMENT OF 18 DECEMBER EMPHASISED SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION BUT HE FEARED THE GERMANS WERE TRYING TO RENEGE. WHAT WAS OUR

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READ-OUT? HE HAD ALSO TAKEN SOUNDINGS IN PARIS AND ROME THE ITALIANS DID NOT LOOK LIKE BREAKING RANKS.

- 3. I SAID WE COULD NOT PREJUDGE THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING BUT WE STRONGLY UPHELD THE CURRENT EC POSITION AND WERE DETERMINED THAT THE EC SHOULD STAY IN LINE BEHIND SCR 768. SAUD EMPHASISED THE SIGNIFICANE OF THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF THE COALITION AGAINST IRAQ SHOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF FRAGMENTING AT THE LAST MINUTE. HE ASSUMED THAT ANY EC INITIATIVE WOULD ONLY BE TAKEN IN CONSULTATION WITH THE USA. THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT ANY DIVERGENCE IN THE US AND EC POSITIONS AT THIS LATE STAGE COULD BE DISASTROUS. HE WAS SEEING US AMBASSADOR TO URGE AMERICAN INTERCESSION WITH EUROPEANS. DID WE KEEP IN TOUCH WITH AMERICANS? I SAID HE COULD TAKE IT WE CERTAINLY DID.
- 4. I ASKED ABOUT SAUDI INTERCESSION IN LUXEMBOURG. MENTIONED THAT AL KHALIFA (KUWAITI FINANCE MINISTER) WOULD BE SEEING POOS TODAY WITH A MESSAGE FROM SABAH AL AHMED. SAUD HIMSELF COULD NOT MEET POOS UNTIL AFTER THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING. I SUGGESTED HE NONETHELESS CONSIDER SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE NEW PRESIDENCY IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING SO THAT SAUDI VIEWS WOULD BE MADE CLEAR. HE TOOK THIS ON BOARD. HIS OWN VISIT TO LUXEMBOURG WOULD COME AS PART OF A EUROPEAN TOUR BEGINNING ON 8 JANUARY. FOR THIS REASON HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE UP YOUR SUGGESTION OF A MEETING IN BAHRAIN ON 12 JANUARY (FCO TELNO 987). SAUD SAID HOWEVER HE WAS KEEN TO MEET YOU AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO TRAVEL TO THE UK DURING HIS EUROPEAN TOUR IF A TIME COULD BE AGREED. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PASS TO US ANY SUGGESTED TIMINGS. SAUD EMPHASISED THAT HE WOULD REMAIN IN KINGDOM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT BEFORE LEAVING ON HIS TRAVELS (AND PRESUMABLY TO SEE BAKER HERE) .

COMMENT

- 5. SAUD'S CONCERN ABOUT THE GERMAN POSITION IS EVIDENTLY EXERCISING HIM. HE HAD PRESUMABLY CALLED IN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AFTER MYSELF IN ORDER TO MAKE THE SAME POINT. SAUD SAID HE WAS WORRIED THAT THE GERMANS FELT THAT THEIR EXPERIENCE IN 1945 GAVE THEM SOME UNIQUE MORAL AUTHORITY TO PURSUE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, INDEPENDENT OF THEIR WESTERN PARTMERS.
- 6. WE HAVE WARNED THAT THE KING WILL PROBABLY SEEK REASSURANCE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE LUXEMBOURG

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PS/MR HOGG PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE PS/PUS MR FAIRWEATHER MR BROOMFIELD STORE SEMOING A MESSAGE MR GORE-BOOTH MR GOULDEN MR JAY MAL & HO SHIMMIBE SUOT MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS) HD / MED HD / AMD HD/CONSULAR D HD/ECD(E) HD / NAD HD/NEWS D HD / NENAD HD / NPDD

IRAQ/KUWAIT HD/SED HD/UND MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY MR APPLEYARD CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE (BY TUBE H29) PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST SIR P CRADOCK, 10 DOWNING ST CABINET OFFICE DIO (BY TUBE H29) SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE AUS (C) MODUK HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND MR WICKS HMT EMERGENCY UNIT (PASSED) D

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