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PART ONE OF TWO

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: EPC MINISTERIAL MEETING, LUXEMBOURG 4 JANUARY:
GULF CRISIS

SUMMARY

1. REAFFIRMATION OF BASIC APPROACH OF TWELVE, BASED ON PREVIOUS STATEMENTS AND UN RESOLUTIONS. NEED FOR INTERNAL COHESION AND SOLIDARITY WITH US AND OTHER ALLIES UNDERLINED. PRESSURE FROM MOST MEMBER STATES FOR MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ TO BE SET UP, IRRESPECTIVE OF FATE OF US INVITATION. UK AND DUTCH RESERVATIONS PRODUCED EVENTUAL COMPROMISE. BUT THIS RENDERED UNNECESSARY BY LATER NEWS OF IRAQI ACCEPTANCE OF US INVITATION. TROIKA MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ NOW SCHEDULED FOR LUXEMBOURG ON 10 JANUARY.

DETAIL

2. POOS (PRESIDENCY) OPENED THE SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MEETING BY REHEARSING THE BASIC LINES OF THE APPROACH OF THE TWELVE. THE ROME COUNCIL STATEMENT HAD UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY AND IRAQ, IN COORDINATION WITH THE ALLIES. THIS WAS A CLEAR COMMITMENT WHICH JUSTIFIED THE RESUMPTION OF CONTACTS, GIVEN THE US/IRAQ IMPASSE. NONETHELESS, THERE WERE TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES: TO AVOID ANY CRACKS IN THE ANTI-IRAQ COALITION SEMI COLON AND TO MAINTAIN EC COHESION. POOS PROPOSED THAT THE TWELVE GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO THE LAST US ATTEMPT TO START A DIALOGUE, AND RESTATE THEIR BASIC REQUIREMENTS, REJECTING ALL OTHER POSSIBILITIES IE A PARTIAL SOLUTION, DIVERSION OF ATTENTION TO WESTERN FORCES IN THE GULF, LINKAGE WITH OTHER ISSUES, AND OVERSHOOTING THE 15 JANUARY DEADLINE. IRAQ MUST NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY COULD SECURE A BETTER DEAL BY TALKING TO THE TWELVE.

3. ON THE PROPOSED MEETING WITH IRAQ, POOS POSED FOUR QUESTIONS:

- (I) SHOULD IT ONLY TAKE PLACE AFTER IRAQI TALKS WITH THE US?
- (II) SHOULD IT BE HELD ELSEWHERE BUT LUXEMBOURG?
- (III) SHOULD IT INVOLVE THE PRESIDENCY ALONE, THE TROIKA OR ANOTHER COMBINATION?
- (IV) SHOULD MORE BE SAID ABOUT THE POSSIBLE POST-CRISIS SCENARIO (COVERING SUCH SUBJECTS AS A NON-AGGRESSION ASSURANCE, A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM, THE PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF WESTERN FORCES TO BE REPLACED BY ARAB FORCES, REGIONAL DISARMAMENT, THE ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, RESPECT FOR ALL FRONTIERS, AN IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFERENCE, A RE-LAUNCH OF THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE)?

4. POOS CONCLUDED THAT MANY COUNTRIES WERE LOOKING TO THE TWELVE TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE. PARALYSIS OR DISUNITY WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND THEIR ROLE ON THE WORLD STAGE. HE ALSO NOTED THE MESSAGE RECEIVED TODAY FROM THE POPE, SUPPORTING DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION OVER THE USE OF ARMS. THIS WAS, HE BELIEVED, THE FIRST MESSAGE THE POPE HAD SENT TO SUCH AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING.

5. POOS' TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES WERE ENDORSED BY ALL SPEAKERS, AND MANY ALSO REFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THE NEED FOR THE TWELVE TO HAVE THEIR OWN POSITION ON THE GULF CRISIS WAS EMPHASISED BY DUMAS (FRANCE), GENSCHER (GERMANY), FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ (SPAIN), EYSKENS (BELGIUM), DE MICHELIS (ITALY), AND COLLINS (IRELAND). THEY ALSO ARGUED THE NEED, AS THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE, FOR EUROPE NOT TO APPEAR SILENT OR INERT.

6. MOST SPEAKERS FOLLOWED THE LINE INITIALLY TAKEN BY DUMAS AT THE START OF THE TOUR DE TABLE, WHICH PROPOSED THAT THE TWELVE ISSUE A STATEMENT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (A) INSISTENCE THAT IRAQ OBSERVE THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND ANNOUNCE ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT.
- (B) AN ASSURANCE TO IRAQ THAT, ONCE WITHDRAWAL HAD TAKEN PLACE, IT WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED.
- (C) AN INDICATION THAT, WITH THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL, THE WAY WOULD BE OPEN FOR ALL OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES WHICH AFFECTED THE SECURITY OF THE REGION TO BE CONSIDERED THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (SUCH AS MITTERRAND HAD MENTIONED AT

THE UN IN SEPTEMBER, AND THE ROME COUNCIL HAD COVERED).

- (D) AN INVITATION TO TARIQ AZIZ TO LUXEMBOURG, TO MEET THE PRESIDENCY OR TROIKA AT THE FIRST POSSIBLE MOMENT BEFORE 15 JANUARY.
- (E) AN EXPRESSION OF TOTAL SUPPORT FOR THE LATEST US INITIATIVE, WHICH DID NOT CONFLICT WITH THE POSITION OF THE TWELVE.
- (F) IMMEDIATE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS (AS NON-ALIGNED CHAIRMAN), THE ARAB COUNTRIES CONCERNED, THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE POPE, AND
- (G) AN EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE REGION.

7. GENSCHER GAVE GENERAL SUPPORT TO THIS POSITION, WHILE EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR THE TWELVE TO RE-AFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE THAT AGGRESSION WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND THAT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE. HE ALSO FAVOURED AN INVITATION TO A MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE IMPORTANT SUPPORT TO THE US INITIATIVE. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ AND EYSKENS SPOKE OF THE NEED NOT TO APPEAR SUBORDINATE TO DECISIONS BY THE US, AND FAVOURED THE APPROACH OUTLINED BY THE FRENCH. THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING SHOULD NOT BE SCHEDULED UNTIL AFTER 9 JANUARY.

8. IN AN EMOTIONAL CONTRIBUTION DE MICHELIS, WHILE SUPPORTING THE POOS/DUMAS APPROACH, ARGUED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY FOR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF WAR, IF THIS WERE NOW NOT DEMONSTRATED IN A FINAL ATTEMPT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT MIGHT BE EASY FOR THE BRITISH AND DUTCH TO ORDER TROOPS INTO BATTLE, BUT WITHOUT SUCH EVIDENCE OF FURTHER COMMITMENT TO PEACE THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT RESPOND. HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH AN INDEPENDENT MEETING OF THE TWELVE AND IRAQ, EVEN IF THE US INVITATION WERE TURNED DOWN. THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE THE OPTION FOR A FINAL US VISIT TO BAGHDAD. HE DID NOT BELIEVE SUCH ACTION BY THE TWELVE WOULD CAUSE UNDUE PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON, FOR WHOM SOLIDARITY AFTER 15 JANUARY REMAINED THE KEY QUESTION.

9. DE DEUS PINHEIRO (PORTUGAL), ELLEMAN-JENSEN (DENMARK) AND SAMARAS (GREECE) WERE LESS GUNG-HO FOR A TWELVE-IRAQ MEETING, BUT WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS, WHILE PREFERRING THAT NO DATE FOR IT BE SETTLED FOR THE MOMENT. DELORS (COMMISSION) SPOKE OF THE TWELVE TAKING AN INITIATIVE, IN A SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE US.

DISCUSSION OF THE POST-CRISIS SCENARIO SHOULD COVER NOT MERELY ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS, BUT THE DEGREE OF OVER-ARMAMENT IN THE REGION, DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS, AND SPECIFIC ISSUES SUCH AS LEBANON.

CAMPBELL

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