

8. ~~2~~h

Copy No 1 of 4 copies

33a-h

Ref. A091/57



PRIME MINISTER

cc Sir Percy Cradock
Mr Appleyard

OPD(G): 10 January

This is a heavy agenda, although no item need take too long: you will no doubt want to run through it briskly.

Item 1: Your visit to the Gulf

You may wish to begin by reporting to colleagues your principal conclusions from your visit to the region. These might include an assessment of the firmness of resolve and realism of the Saudi leadership and other governments, their expectations for the duration of a conflict and post-conflict regional security arrangements and the readiness and morale of our forces in-theatre. Media coverage was very favourable and helpful. You might conclude the discussion by indicating any further work which needs to be done and by recalling that you will compare notes with Mr Baker on Sunday.

Item 2: Current international situation

2. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to brief colleagues on the outcome of Mr Baker's meeting with Tariq Aziz. At the time of drafting the talks were in their third session this evening. The US comment (from Mr Seitz in the US delegation) was that the talks had been substantive but had not moved matters forward. We should have a clearer picture by tomorrow morning.

Replies to
- Gnd. Force
or adviser.

✓ [New dated for 1630/1730 at Alconbury on Sunday]



Sec. Gen. 6

3. The outcome is bound to result in a renewed burst of Eurodiplomacy, on which the situation may well change overnight. The French attitude is likely to be particularly self-centred and opportunistic, though Admiral Lanxade repeated to the Defence Secretary on Tuesday earlier French assurances that France would take part in offensive operations. M. Vauzelle's visit to Baghdad and the visit of the Secretary General of the Elysee to Algiers form part of the French strategy. Mr Baker saw President Mitterrand on his way to Geneva and was not given a clear steer. President Mitterrand has called a press conference today and at the time of writing it looks as though there may be a French initiative possibly dressed up as a Franco-Arab peace move. President Mitterrand earlier spoke of possibly calling for a Security Council meeting and also a Middle East Conference: M. Dumas may be despatched to Baghdad. French motives are probably to demonstrate distance and independence from Washington in order to bolster France's post-conflict political and arms sales position. Although Chancellor Kohl appears to have given a firm message to Mr Baker, the German attitude is likely to be covertly supportive of any French move.

4. Meanwhile the Luxembourg Presidency is still looking for a European role, probably in the form of a troika meeting with Tariq Aziz in Algiers on 10, 11 or 12 January. The Dutch share our concern over the potential harm which uncoordinated moves could cause (Mr Van den Broek has been in constant touch with the Foreign Secretary) but the rest of the Community will go along with whatever is proposed. The UN Secretary General may also feel obliged (or pressured) into making a final bid for peace by travelling to Baghdad. No moves so far to recall the Security Council but this cannot be ruled out.

5. The Foreign Secretary hopes to contact Mr Baker today to obtain a read-out of his meeting with Tariq Aziz. There will doubtless have been a number of further developments overnight. You might conclude the discussion by summarising the results of

65) of info
- and Parv's



the discussion and inviting the Foreign Secretary to keep colleagues closely informed over the next few days.

3. UK/US Talks

No. 1 X
6. You might invite Mr Appleyard to summarise the outcome of the talks on 7 January on which colleagues will have seen the note by officials. Agreement was reached on a satisfactory text of the paper on strategic and military objectives. The US team still insist that it is not a joint document, since they are nervous about the use which might be made of it in Washington, but accepted that it accurately represented the approaches of both governments. You might invite the Committee to approve the text.

2
7. Under the discussion on collateral damage from attacks on nuclear, chemical and biological facilities we gave the US team a revised note on CW and BW. On present plans such attacks would be carried out by US, and not British, aircraft. On CW General Schwarzkopf was confident that an attack using high explosive followed by incendiaries could be mounted successfully thus reducing the downwind risk. General Schwarzkopf's team are doing further work on attacks on BW agent storage facilities (the point of main concern to our experts) and will take a decision when this work has been completed. They undertook to let us know the results and the guidelines which they will use. MOD are following this up through the Joint Commander, together with our offer of discussions with our experts. US assurances are now embodied in paragraph 7c of the objectives paper. You might conclude the discussion on this topic by inviting MOD to follow up and by noting that you might mention the issue to Mr Baker at the weekend.

3
8. The Foreign Secretary secured a commitment from Mr Baker that, if the US Government was contemplating an escalation of the allied offensive to deter Saddam Hussain from further action

*Deliberate reprisals.*

d

outside accepted international norms, you would be consulted. The Attorney General has been briefed to outline the legal situation under the doctrine of reprisals. You may wish to raise the general issue with Mr Baker at the weekend.

9. There was a useful initial exchange on joint consultation which will be take forward at official level in the margins of your talks with Mr Baker. The Cabinet Office will produce a note immediately thereafter proposing a set of arrangements.

10. For your talks with Mr Baker the agenda might include latest developments on the diplomatic front; joint consultations, including clearance with the Saudis; the response to an Iraqi partial withdrawal; attacks on CW and BW storage facilities; and public presentation at the start of hostilities (your and President Bush's speeches to the nation). Congress is due to begin debating the Gulf tomorrow.

Item 4: Consular advice and contingency plans for evacuation

11. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce his paper which recommends further efforts to reduce the size of British communities in the area, advice to the communities to stay put in the immediate aftermath of hostilities and detailed contingency planning for evacuation using civilian and military aircraft. You may wish to confirm that colleagues agree with the advice to communities.

12. On evacuation planning the Defence Secretary is looking at the possibility of leaving some of the naval cargo/ container vessels used in the sealift in place in the Gulf in case they are needed. The Secretary of State for Transport will announce today a scheme for providing war-risk marine insurance for commercial shipping to continue to operate and similar measures are in preparation for aviation insurance. Nevertheless, there is likely to be a significant drop in available marine and aviation



e

commercial capacity as the deadline approaches. The FCO is discussing future flights to the Gulf with British Airways today. FCO, Department of Transport and MoD are examining the possibility of requisitioning aircraft if need be, though there would still be crewing problems. They are also exploring the use of ships. You may want to take colleagues' minds on whether evacuees should be asked to give formal undertakings to repay. You might conclude the discussion by inviting the FCO and MoD to accelerate their evacuation planning on a contingency basis in consultation with companies, the US Administration and WEU countries (who could help with shipping and aircraft).

13. Meanwhile the Foreign Secretary is considering authorising the British Embassy staff in Baghdad to leave quietly by road tomorrow through Jordan subject to the outcome of Mr Baker's meeting with Tariq Aziz. The US Government still plans to withdraw the US Embassy on 12 January. Neither we nor the US Government intend to break off diplomatic relations.

Item 5: Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait: immediate reactions

14. You might invite the Foreign Secretary to introduce his paper which, if agreed, would form the basis for the further exchanges with the US Administration at your level and at official level at the weekend. The outline of a public statement seems sensible. You might ask the Defence Secretary for his comments on military action. You might conclude the discussion by inviting the Committee to approve the recommendations that we should consult the Americans on the approach outlined in the paper and complete work in hand to identify the criteria for measuring Iraqi withdrawal.

Item 6: Rules of Engagement

15. You might invite the Defence Secretary to introduce his paper which provides draft Rules of Engagement (ROE) for two



f

eventualities: a large-scale Iraqi attack; and an allied offensive. Ministers have already agreed ROE in case of a limited Iraqi attack.

16. On an allied offensive you may wish to avoid detailed discussion since there are no significant political implications in the ROE themselves which would only come into effect upon specific authorisation by Ministers. You might ask the Attorney General if he is content with the legal basis and the Foreign Secretary if there are likely to be problems with the US and our coalition allies.

17. On the response to a large-scale Iraqi attack you may wish to note that the ROE confer delegated responsibility to UK commanders in extremis if there is no time or facilities rapidly to consult Ministers. You might ask the Defence Secretary to confirm that the scale of action under delegated authority is sufficiently carefully defined to safeguard the decision-making right of Ministers on whether to move to a general offensive.

18. You might conclude the discussion by inviting colleagues to authorise the ROE subject to points made in the meeting.

[Belt] 19. You may wish to touch briefly on the US request for deployment of a carrier group. The Defence Secretary has sent a Private Secretary letter today in response to earlier queries from you and other colleagues proposing that the Ark Royal carrier group should not go to the Red Sea but should deploy to the Mediterranean as originally planned with a more limited wiring enhancement costing £1m (not £18m). The carrier group could deploy to the Red Sea or the Gulf quite quickly from the Mediterranean. You may wish to invite colleagues to approve the proposal as now modified.



Item 7: Media arrangements

20. The Energy Secretary has requested approval of the media handling arrangements at Ministerial and official level following last week's discussion on OPD(G). Unless there are specific comments on the proposals, you may wish to invite colleagues to approve the arrangements.

IEA Stockdraw

21. President Bush has approached you, in a message of 9 January, since the UK is Chairman of the IEA Governing Board, about a co-ordinated stockdraw in case of hostilities. The Energy Secretary can advise if there is time to discuss this item.

Meeting Arrangements

22. There has been a good deal of discussion between Departments and with the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary on a structure of daily meetings if hostilities break out. The difficulty lies in having sufficient time to prepare material for the Ministerial meeting each day and yet having OPD(G) early enough to settle public lines in time for the lobby and lunchtime news bulletins. In the light of that, the proposed daily schedule is:

Previous evening	-	Permanent Secretaries' discussion of OPD(G) agenda for following day
6.00 am	-	JIC meets to produce daily assessment
7.30 - 8.00 am	-	Distribution of daily assessment



h

- 8.30 am - Cabinet Office meeting to finalise agenda and briefing for OPD(G) in light of overnight developments
- 9.15 - 10.00 am - Departments brief Ministers
- 10.00 am - Meeting of OPD(G)

It is suggested that Mr O'Donnell is invited to join the meeting of OPD(G) AT 10.45 am for discussion of the line to be taken at any matters likely to be raised at the lobby. We will have to be prepared to adjust these arrangements in the light of experience, if necessary, but it would be helpful to have OPD(G)'s agreement that we start on this basis.

23. Immediately following OPD(G) you are having a political meeting on next week's Parliamentary debate. The Chief Whip and Lord President will let you have a joint note later this evening. It is expected to propose that there should be a debate on a motion for adjournment on 15 January with you opening and the Foreign Secretary winding up. The aim would be to present an agreed decision to Cabinet.

[You are invited to a statement].

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

9 January 1991